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Abstract - Water pricing has been a key concern in Tunisia for the last two decades. It is reco-
gnized that the average price of water remains very low as compared to the marginal value of water
as well to the cost of mobilization of water. Alternatives to better allocation of water resources have
been sought mainly with the increasing scarcity of this resource and the expanding irrigated lands.
Failure to estimate a water price that reflects its real value would lead to sub-optimal allocation of
water and in general to policy failure problems. Water markets have been a promising institutional
arrangement for better allocation of water as demonstrated by diverse experiences of many countries.
This paper attempts to examine the effects of the implementation of a market for water in Tunisia.
Our hypothesis is that market allocation of water resources would improve the value of water (water
price) and its distribution among farmers. Users will adjust their demand for water and then change
production patterns, which lead to improved farm revenues (total farmers revenues). The paper com-
pares the baseline (current) allocation to allocations based on alternative market structures extremes
namely pure competition and monopoly.
Key words : water pricing, marginal value, Tunisia.
1 Introduction
Water pricing has been a key concern in Tunisia for the last two decades. It is recognized that
the average price of water remains very low as compared to the marginal value of water as well
to the cost of mobilization of water. Alternatives to better allocation of water resources have
been sought mainly with the increasing scarcity of this resource and the expansion of irrigated
lands. Failure to estimate a water price that reflects its real value would lead to sub-optimal
allocation of water and in general to policy failure problems (Ahmad, 1998, 2001[1]).
Water markets have been a promising institutional arrangement for better allocation of water as
demonstrated by diverse experiences of many countries. Among the most cited countries where
such an experience has gained grounds we find Chile in Latin America where a system of water-
use rights was re-established in 1981, and Jordan Valley in Palestine and Yemen in the Middle
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East region. These institutional arrangements require well defined property rights over water.
Unfortunately such a condition is lacking in Tunisia.
In Tunisia, past water management experiences have focused mainly on supply expansion solu-
tions. These solutions deemed not sustainable given the increasing investment costs on one hand
and the low cost recovery on the other hand. World wide, the expansion of agriculture has been
accompanied by increased mobilization costs of traditional ground water sources due to physical
and technical constraints. Between 1970 and 1990 such costs have doubled in some Asian and
African countries (Rosegrant et al., 2002[11] ; Rosegrant and Svendsen, 1993[10] ; Dinar and Su-
bramanian, 1997[5] ; FAO, 1992[6]). This cost increase has resulted in a divergence between the
economic value of water and the price paid by users although in many of these countries water
mobilization costs are heavily subsidized.
Emphasis, instead, has shifted from supply expansion to demand management, mainly that as-
sociated with agricultural use since this sector alone consumes more than 80% of water available
in most countries. To this end technologies of water conservation have been diffused, appropriate
legal institutions were developed and pricing systems to managing individual demands as well
as insuring full cost recovery were initiated. Water pricing to bring about the actual price to its
economic value has been the most recommended instrument in order to increase the efficiency
of water use. The economic literature, however, is rich of controversial effects of higher water
pricing solutions on water demand. Caswell and Zilberman (1985[2]) and Caswell et al. (1990[3])
show positive effects of increasing water price on water conservation technology adoption. Whe-
reas Varela-Ortega et al. (1998[14]) show that such effect is related to other factors namely the
potential of diversification, water allocation and risk of water delivery. Other studies stipulate
that an increase of water price may induce positive demand response only in the range of prices
where the demand is elastic (Gomez-Limon and Riesgo, 2002[7] ; De Fraiture and Perry, 2002).
The method utilized to estimate water price may itself be problematic. Tsur and Dinar (1997[13])
studied different methods such as the volumetric pricing, the output-input pricing, the area pri-
cing, the tiered and two part tariff pricing and the water markets pricing, and found that the
effects are more manifest on the cropping mix rather than on water demand for each particular
crop. To allow for better allocation and management of water resources, water would rather be
expected to be exchanged among farmers on a market-based mechanism. There are a number of
studies that have assessed the impacts of a water market on the usage of water. The examples of
Chile and Mexico witness the potential of a market-solution to insure better availability and allo-
cation of the resource (Thobani, 1998[12]). In Pakistan, the implementation of market exchange
of water in two regions has resulted in the reallocation of water by 18% and 29% respectively.
Impacts on farm revenues however remain as low as 2% and 5% respectively (Morardet et al.,
1994[9]).
Water distribution rules before the instauration of the market would influence the size of impact
of such allocation system. Ex ante rules would lead to important effects on the adoption of market
mechanism but may also decrease the chance of implementation of the market. On the other
side, ex post rules would reduce the market impacts. In sum, the instauration of water markets
has been an efficient way to improve the use of water through its reallocation among users.
Compared to administrated prices, the market would insure efficient water rights exchange, lead
to lower transaction costs and improve the efficiency of irrigation water.
This paper attempts to examine the effects of the implementation of a market for water in
Tunisia. Our hypothesis is that market allocation of water resources would improve the value
of water (water price) and its distribution among farmers. Users will adjust their demand for
water and then change production patterns, which lead to improved farm revenues. The paper
compares the baseline (current) allocation to alternative allocation systems based on different
market structures namely pure competition and monopoly. On the basis of the results of this
study it would be possible to conduct an ex ante evaluation of a water market. The paper is
organized as follows. In the next section a brief overview of water policies in Tunisia is presented.
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In section three we present the methodology used in the study to assess the effects of a potential
water-market. Section four is reserved to the discussion of results, which will be followed by final
recommendations and conclusions in the last section.
2 Overview of water policies in Tunisia
During the last four decades water management policy in Tunisia has gone through two major
periods. During the first period efforts concentrated on the mobilization of water resources and
the implementation of requisite infrastructure to the distribution of these resources all over the
country. This has contributed to extend irrigated areas, intensify, diversify and regulate the
agricultural systems. Along side to the mobilization efforts water has been subsided according
to a pricing scheme which covers only part of the variable costs. With the increasing number of
works (dams) the costs have been to the increase as well (table 1).
A combined pricing scheme based on a quota system and a price support is then applied leading
to different water values as depicted in the analytical framework in figure 1.
Tab. 1 – The cost of selected dams and the corresponding water marginal cost.
Dams Volume of water
regularized (1000
m3)
Cost of investment per volume
of water regularized (DT/m3)
Marginal cost esti-
mated
(DT/m3)
Sidi Barrak
Sidi Aich
Barbra
El Houareb
Zaiatine
El Gamgoum
El Abid
190 000
20 000
80 000
27 000
17 000
7 000
2 500
0,800
1,590
2,260
2,620
4,290
6,760
8,40
0,071
0,143
0,204
0,236
0,387
0,608
0,756
Source : Ministe`re de l’agriculture (1999). (DT : Tunisian Dinar).
Fig. 1 – Price support and a quota system combined policy. (Pr : Price paid by farmers at present state,
qi : Water quota for the ith farm ; ρi : value of water (per cubic meter) at the ith farm)
The second period of water management has been marked by the development of the industrial
and tourism sectors as competitors to the traditional water consuming sector ; i.e. agriculture
in addition to increased demand for water in agriculture as a result of newly created areas and
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intensification efforts. The demand for water has increased substantially. Therefore, the new
water policy has turned to the management and regulation of demand while continuing the
effort of water mobilization. Further, following the economic adjustment policy adopted since
late 1980s, subsidies were also revised to be gradually removed. Hence, a new pricing system
were sought to find a compromise between the government seeking to cover investment costs, the
service manager looking to adjust financial costs and the farmers whose objective remains to have
water at lower costs. This deregulation policy was achieved by transferring water management
from the state to the newly created farmers’ associations in 1999, called locally “Groupements
d’inte´reˆt collectif” and referred to hereafter as GIC.
Both policies have maintained the same water access procedures notably the property right and
water distribution criteria. Since 1975 the private governorship of water has changed to water
use right instead. Moreover, water has been distributed according to land size regardless of crop
choices. This has resulted in trials by farmers to improve water quantities either by exchange
with neighbors or by surface water drilling. Such emerging water allocations reflected different
water values among farmers exchanging water.
3 Implementation of a market for water : Methodology
3.1 Site selection and farm characterisation
To analyse the effects of a market for water an irrigated area called Melalasa in a central region
of Tunisia (Kairouan) where a GIC has been active for few years was selected. This choice was
also indicated by the existence of different water values as found from previous investigations as
well as observed informal exchange of water among farmers. The area under study was developed
in 1992. The GIC was established in 1994 according to the latest water management legislation.
These farms are not similar in terms of endowments in primary factors (such as labor and water)
as well as in cropping systems (irrigated vs rainfall) (table 2). Cropping system consists basically
of cereals, vegetables and fruit trees mainly olive trees. Irrigated crops represent 48,6% % for
farms type 4 and 77,1% for farms type 5 with an average of 60%.
Data were gathered through questionnaires administered to a selected sample of farmers belon-
ging to the local GIC. Then, the sample was sorted into groups according to structural variables
such as the farm size and production factors. This sorting process has resulted into five farm
models or types.
Tab. 2 – Characteristics of farm models.
Farm type Number Farming system (ha) Labor Current Water
Dry (ha) Irrigated
(ha)
Total (ha) (day/year) Consumption
(m3) (Quotas)
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4
Type 5
17
14
12
5
6
1,52
4,43
4,67
4,25
3,21
1,69
5,51
7,40
4,02
10,86
3,21
9,94
12,07
8,27
14,07
140
430
540
590
815
4375,900
10633,800
13810,200
17767,500
20285,000
Total GIC 54 184,41 279,93 464,34 22720 599533
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3.2 Market structure and gains from exchange
3.2.1 Case of a competitive market structure
In this case, we assume that each farm belonging to the pre-selected farm models could parti-
cipate in the market either by demanding or supplying water (assuming factor mobility). Such
exchange would result into gains according to the market structure under consideration.
Fig. 2 – Exchange in competitive market.
Exchange in a market based on a pure competitive structure would result in gains as a result
of the existence of a differential in the value of water (price) (figure 2). The value differential
comes from either different initial endowments in productive factors (such as capital equipments)
or different production techniques leading to higher productivity among farms. Distribution of
gains (gain to buyer and gain to seller) are determined by the structure of demand curves D1
and D2 (demand elasticities) and the respective values of water ρ1 and ρ2.
3.2.2 Case of a monopolistic structure
In a monopolistic market structure (a situation where water is assumed to be fully detained by
the GIC), producers would be worseoff as compared to the previous structure but water would
have a higher value. In this case the quantity of water consumed (utilized) Qmo is derived from
the GIC marginal cost of water (Cm) and it’s marginal revenue (Rm) whereas the aggregate
demand is derived from the first market structure1. This quantity is lower than that in the
competitive market case.
These two market structures are used by establishing a baseline model which would be adjusted
to reflect such structures.
3.3 Baseline model
To analyze these exchange possibilities taking into account the described market structures a
mathematical programming approach was used. In a first stage a baseline
1The evaluation of the demand equation with respect to aggregate water endowments allow to derive different opportunity
costs On the basis of these costs and quantities demanded it was possible to draw a global demand curve.
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Fig. 3 – Exchange in monopolistic market.
model is specified to reflect the current functioning of the system. In a second stage we trans-
formed the model to consider the two market structures.
The baseline situation was represented with a model which uses the positive mathematical
programming (PMP) method with increasing production costs as suggested by Howitt (1995,
2000) and Gohin and Chantreuil (2000). The objective function assumes the maximization of
total revenue which is evaluated as a weighted sum of the selected farm revenues :
MaxZ =
n∑
i
REVi ∗ nbri (1)
Where :
– Z : total revenue ;
– REVi : individual farm revenue ;
– i :1, . . . n is the farm type (n=5) ;
– nbri : number of farms by group ;
The revenue of each farm i is defined by the gross margin :
REVi =
m∑
i
Xij rdtij Pj −
m∑
i
αj Xij + βj X2ij (2)
Where :
– j : 1, . . . , m denote agricultural activities ;
– Xji : the level of crop j at farm i ;
– rdtji : return of crop j at farm i ;
– Pj : price of crop j
– αj and βj : calibration parameters according to PMP method which are a nonlinear
representation of the production costs. αj Xji + βj X2ji
The model constraints reflect the availability of productive factors. These constraints were pre-
sented in the model as follows :
m∑
i
Xij ≤ Flandi (3)
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m∑
i
XijClabj ≤ Flabi (4)
m∑
i
XijCwaterj ≤ Fwateri (5)
m∑
i
XijCwaterjuswateri (6)
Where :
– Flandi : area of farm i ;
– Flabi : quantity of family labo rat farm i ;
– Fwateri : quantity of water available at farm i (water right or quota) ;
– Clabj : stand for labour requirements ;
– Cwaterj : water requirements.
As such, equations 3 and 4 represent the land and labor constraints respectively, equation 5 is
used to compute water consumption and equation 6 refers to the water availability (constraint).
The area of olive trees is assumed to be fixed. This baseline structure will be used to analyse
the two market structures namely the competitive market and the monopolistic markets.
4 Competitive market model
In this case it is assumed that exchange takes place among farm types in a perfectly competitive
market.
In this market structure the constraint 6 is replaced by a constraint at the level of the GIC (zone
under the GIC control) in which the demand is aggregated over all individual water demands.
This is shown in the following equation :
n∑
i
nbri ∗ uswateri ≤
n∑
i
nbri ∗ Fwateri (7)
The simulation of this situation is done following two procedures. The first procedure consists
of transforming constraint 5-1 to reflect water balance for each farm as follows :
Uswateri +Woni = Fwateri +Wini (8)
n∑
i
nbrEi ∗ uswateri ≤
n∑
i
nbrEi ∗ Fwateri (9)
With Woni and Wini refer to the sales and purchases of water at farm i respectively. The dual
value of equation 9 is the equilibrium price of water.
The equilibrium price is the shadow price of equation 9. Quantities exchanged (Woni and Wini)
are computed as the difference between water allocations in the base line and the new situation
respectively.
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4.1 Monopolistic market model
In the case of a monopolistic structure, the exchange of irrigation water is supposed to be
administrated by the GIC as a single possessor of water. The monopolistic price is determined
according to the equalization of marginal cost and marginal revenue. This case is in fact the full
cost recovery scenario. This monopolist is facing the aggregate demand derived from the sum of
all farm demands.
Compared to the base line model only the price Pwater has changed.
REVi =
m∑
j
Xji ∗ rdtji ∗ Pj −
m∑
j
αj ∗Xji + βj ∗X2j - uswateri ∗ Pmonopole (10)
The determination of water price elasticity was derived from the estimated demand function. To
determine the quantities demanded (the dependent variable in the demand function) the model
was run and simulated for different water endowments.
In the estimation we introduced a dummy variable to reflect the observed turning point of the
demand curve at a quantity of 281781 m3 .
Pi = a+ bqi+ εi if qi ≤ 281781 m3 (11)
Pi = α+ βqi+ εi if qi > 281781 m3 (12)
Combining these models yields the following model to be estimated :
Pi = a+ (α− a)D0 + bqi+ (β − b)D1qi + εi (13)
where, {
D0 = 0 if qi ≤ 281781 m3
D0 = 1 if qi > 281781 m3
{
D1 = 0 if qi ≤ 281781 m3
D1 = 1 if qi > 281781 m3
Results are presented in Table 3.
Tab. 3 – Estimation results of aggregate water demand curves.
Variables Coefficient t-test Standard Error
Intercept 0,28 4,50 0,10
D0 0,49 - 3,79 - 0,41 10−6
D1q - 0,15 10−5 - 7,23 - 0,20 10-7
Q - 0,15 10−6 -21,16 - 0,1310−1
R2 adjusted 0,97
Number of observations 12
A quadratic cost function is also estimated for the period of time running from 1998 to 2003
using data avaiblable at the GIC level (table 4). We also used a dummy variable as follows :
CTt = a+ (α− a)D0 + bqt + cq2t (14)
The`me 3 : Contraintes et strate´gies de modernisation de l’irrigation
dans les petites exploitations agricoles familiales
Bachta et al.
Actes du Se´minaire ”Modernisation de l’Agriculture Irrigue´e” 9
where, {
D0 = 0 if qt ≤ 270396 m3
D0 = 1 if qt > 270396 m3
Tab. 4 – Estimation of the GIC cost function.
Variables Coefficient t-test Standard Error
Intercept - 69376 - 64,49 1076
D0 30052 69,70 431,1
q 0,2096 41,17 0,5091 10−2
q2 - 0,7535 10−7 - 10,96 0,6874 10−8
R2 adjusted 0,99
Number of observations 12
5 Empirical results
The following analysis concerns the two market structures as applied to the selected typical
farms in the study zone. Effects of such models are analyzed in terms of changes in cropping
systems as well the revenues. Changes in farmers’ revenues are used as an efficiency indicator.
All changes are computed based on the baseline situation which should be regenerated by the
model and consistent with the observed situation.
5.1 Baseline situation
The PMP method was crucial to obtain results as close as possible of the real observed situation
(table 5).
Construction of demand curves Using these results as starting values the model was then
used to investigate various changes as a result of an increase in water price. Individual and
aggregate demand curves for irrigation water were derived by varying water price in the model.
The differences shown in Figure ?? are due to the heterogeneity of production systems and
characteristics of farms. It is also shown that the aggregate demand is relatively price elastic,
whereas at the individual level the demand is less elastic. In particular farm type 1 has a rather
inelastic demand. Another important result is the fact that price elasticity depend on the range of
price. This is particularly visible in the case of farm-type 4 demand and the aggregate demand
curve. This finding was equally shown in other empirical studies (Gomez-Limon and Riesgo,
2002[7] ; De Fraiture and Perry, 2002).
5.2 The impact of market structure
Giving the baseline situation we intend in what follows to analyze the impacts of two hypothetical
water-market structures.
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Tab. 5 –
Activities E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Total GIC
Cropping system (ha)
- Ble´ dur en sec 0,67 1,61 1,45 1,35 0,71 62
- Ble´ dur en irrigue´ 1,41 2,86 5,13 3,08 4,10 166
- Fe`ve 0,21 0,27 0,31 0,77 0,00 15
- Paste`que et melon 0,21 0,27 0,31 0,77 0,50 18
- Olivier en sec 0,28 1,89 2,57 2,52 1,17 82
- Olivier en irrigue´ 0,45 0,54 0,68 0,78 4,41 54
Rainfall (ha) 0,94 3,50 4,02 3,87 1,87 144
Irrigated (ha) 2,27 3,94 6,43 5,39 9,01 252
Water consumption (m3)* 4 376 10 634 13 810 17 768 20 285 599 533
Revenue before payment of water
(DT**)
3 547 7 868 7 681 8 644 8 997 359 825
Water opportunity cost (DT/ m3) 0,231 0,212 0,222 0,143 0,361 0,212
(∗) : Water consumptions represent farms’ endowments which could be exchanged.
(∗∗) DT :Tunisian dinar.
Fig. 4 – Water demand curves for the different farm types.
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5.2.1 Case of monopoly
Using the results in table 3 and equating marginal revenue to marginal cost, the monopoly price
corresponding to a demand elasticity of –1,12 is equal to 0,481 DT/m3. Compared to the actual
price this monopoly price is clearly higher, which is as expected. Simulations of the effects of a
market allocation in the presence of a monopoly are shown in table 6. These effects are presented
as variations with regards to the base situations of areas and crops cultivated.
Tab. 6 – Variation of land use and water consumption.
Activities E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Total
(GIC)
Cropping system
- Ble´ dur en sec 342 100 100 100 100 144
- Ble´ dur en irrigue´ 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Fe`ve 9 81 0 0 0 23
- Paste`que et melon 92 90 94 88 77 89
- Olivier en sec 199 128 118 131 111 127
- Olivier en irrigue´ 39 0 31 0 97 58
Rainfall area 300 115 112 120 107 135
Irrigated area 17 12 8 13 52 20
Water consumption 33 20 13 15 61 27
Revenue before payment of water 58 64 52 55 1 49
Unit : base line situation equal 100.
Results show that variations occur at two levels ; the crops grown as well as farmer revenue. In
general, the immediate impact of a higher water price is a shift in the cropping system towards
non-irrigated crops, lower water demand and a negative effect on revenues (see farm 3, 4, and 5).
Such a decline in the revenue could be interpreted as the social cost attributed to a monopolistic
market structure. On the other hand, the GIC revenue from water sales has increased.
5.2.2 Case of a competitive market
As an alternative to the monopolistic structure, we have assumed a market where transfers of
water take place between farmers in a competitive manner. Results of such a new situation are
shown is table 7.
Compared to the base situation it appears that farmers, depending on the value of water which
they could reach, adopt two strategies. In fact, farmers, with low values of water and belonging
to type 2 have decreased irrigated area and water use whereas the others, with the highest values
have had the opposite attitude. Results in table 6 confirm that the first category of farmers gave
up part of their water (rights) to the second category. This transfer followed the simple rule that
the opportunity cost of water for type 2 farmers is lower to the equilibrium price set up at the
established market. This finding confirms also that the market is a medium to transfer water
from less productive farms to the more productive ones.
The overall result is an increase of the revenue at the GIC level by 14%. On the contrary,
the distribution of total revenues taking into account sales of water has improved with the
establishment of the water market. This overall improvement results from the fact that the
higher valorization of water is now being shared among a higher number of farmers. Compared
to the case of monopoly, the competitive market structure has induced a higher utilization of
water and therefore higher revenues for farmers.
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Tab. 7 – Variation in land use and water consumption- case of a competitive market unit : base line
situation equal 10
Activities E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Total GIC
Cropping system
- Ble´ dur en sec 0 100 98 100 9 75
- Ble´ dur en irrigue´ 147 60 132 0 191 113
- Fe`ve 100 100 102 54 0 89
- Paste`que et melon 100 100 100 98 120 103
- Olivier en sec 92 100 99 108 86 99
- Olivier en irrigue´ 105 100 103 74 104 101
Rainfall cropping acreage 27 100 99 105 57 89
Irrigated cropping acreage 130 71 126 32 144 109
Water consumption 124 73 124 31 136 100
Revenue before payment of water 107 92 110 79 128 103
6 Decomposition of water market effects
Referreing to figures 1 and 2 above the effect of exchange is decomposed into three effects ;
revenue effect, support effect and a cost recovery effect. These effects are presented below with
the different scenarios (no exchange, exchange in a competitive market and exchange in a mo-
nopolistic market) (table 8 and 9).
Tab. 8 – Revenue effects.
Aggregate
Water Net revenue (water charges are not considered) Revenue
price Formula E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 (GIC) in TD
No ex-
change
Pr R(E)− Pr ∗Qwater−quota 3240 7124 6714 7400 7577 317858
With
exchange
Pr R
′(E)− (Pr Qwater−quota)
+Pm (Qwater−quota −Qmarket)
3260 7125 6746 8197 8527 328270
Pm R
′(E)− Pm Qmarket 2638 5615 4785 5674 5646 243137
Monopoly Pmon R”(E) 2073 4999 3981 4742 129 177490
Pr : current price in TD/m3
Pm : competitive market price in TD/m3
Pmon : monopoly price in TD/m3
R(E) : initial revenue before payment of water for farm E
R′(E) : farm revenue before payment of water in the case of exchange
R”(E) : farm revenue in the case of monopoly
Finally, the improvement in cost recovery is depicted as follows :
CR1 : cost recovery without market :
= (quantity of water sold * current price / cost) = (Qquota Pr)/cost)
CR2 : cost recovery in a market situation :
= (quantity of water sold * market price / cost) = (Qquota Pm)/cost)
Given the same quantity of water being sold in both cases so the costs are identical. The
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Tab. 9 – Public Support effects.
Price of
water
Public support via water pricing (in TD)
Formula E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 GIC
No market Pr Qquota(E) ∗ (Pdual(E)−Pr) 705 1510 2099 1297 5903 100209
With a
competitive
Pr Qquota(E) ∗ (Pm − Pr) 621 1510 1961 2523 2880 85134
market Pm Qquota(E) ∗ (Pm − Pm) 0 0 0 0 0 0
monopoly Pmon Qmonopoly(E)∗(Pm−Pmon) -
386
-
569
-
487
-
726
-
3333
-
43992
Note : Dual(E) : refers to shaddow price which represents the real value of water.
It also indicates the willingness to pay for water.
improvement in cost recovery is then given by (Pm − Pr)/Pr ∗ 100 which yields a rate of 203%
as compared to the baseline situation. In the case of the monopoly the quantitites of water are
different and so are the costs. In such a case it is difficult to determine the rate of cost recovery.
7 Conclusions
Despite the rapid evolution of hydraulic policies over the last two decades, water distribution
rules at public irrigated areas (almost 43% of total irrigated area) have remained independent of
actual uses and ignored potential interactions that could take place among farmers. Given this
situation, differential valorization potential are being noticed and have resulted in some water
exchange initiatives though poorly organized among farmers.
The paper attempts to simulate the observed market arrangements into a formal water rights
market. To this end two structures have been considered ; the first is one of a competitive market.
Farmers are free to exchange water according to their initial potential water values. Trade will
result in improvement of the productive efficiency of water and therefore higher overall revenue
of farmers.
The second structure is one where the GIC plays the role of a monopolist. It is suggested
that the GIC would possess all water resources. The market mechanism is this case has led to
decreasing water consumption by increasing productive efficiency. Farmers’ revenues however
have decreased as compared to the initial allocation as well as to the competitive market case.
These simulation assumes that such a market is feasible ; i.e. that exchange is possible and that
farmers could organize without higher transactions costs. Farmers with lower performance (value
of water) are supposed to sell their water rights to those with higher performance. Such exchange
is not always possible and could be induced if an appropriate system whereby an optimum water
revenue tax was established to encourage optimal use of water.
Assuming the GIC as a monopolist raises two difficulties. The first has to do with the current
status of the GIC which is conceived as a farmers’ association having no monopolistic behavior.
The second more fundamental problem is the free access to surface water and the possibility to
have water by drilling wells. Such a possibility would exclude the potential for a monopolistic
structure. The appropriate market structure to describe such a situation becomes one of sta-
ckelberg type. In this case small farmers would compete with a bigger water producer such as
a newly created organism to manage water from drills and dams. Finally, in this paper water
needs by crops were assumed constant. We can consider variations of these needs and examine
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yield changes to different water quantities using a bio-physical model.
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